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Until a shining surge floats o'er their souls,  
 And in a fairy touch so gilds their face  
 That it becomes the mirror of the wave,  
 And earth and sky and air uplift their prayer,  
 And the sweet music of the low-voiced sea  
 Says: "Take us, we are Thine, do as Thou wilt,  
 Slaves to Thy bidding, O, too glad we serve."

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## THE TWO KINDS OF DIALECTIC.

[We have received the following valuable contribution from Rev. Dr. L. P. HICKOK, for our "Notes and Discussions." We insert it here, and will reserve our comments for another place.]—EDITOR.

*Editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy:*

SIR—You have written so clearly that I readily take the standpoint from which you view *a priori* truth. I am not so sure that I can give to you my own so completely. My attempt to do so, as concisely as I can, is as follows—

Logic gives the law of thought, and is logic proper when connecting phenomena into judgments; but when carried beyond phenomenal connections into questionings of thought itself, it then becomes dialectic and is of two kinds only, though the logic may have many varieties. The logical law will regulate the dialectical process, but in one kind the dialectic will be within the ruling of the Logic of Reason, which has no varieties; and in the other kind it will take the regulation of the Logic of the Understanding, which will be modified into many varieties. The logic of reason will carry the dialectical process from universals to particulars, and the logic of the understanding in all its varieties will take the dialectical process from particulars to the universal. The former process will be by continual concretions, and may be termed the concrete or Platonic Dialectic; the latter will be by perpetual abstractions, and may be known as the abstract or Aristotelian Dialectic.

I. THE PLATONIC DIALECTIC. When we observe an acorn as it grows onward to an oak, it is phenomenal only through all the

course, but beyond this sense-observation, the reason-insight detects the inner life-power which has all along been determining the passing phenomena, and which has been the real acorn and oak through all the process. And just so with every natural and artificial object; a stone, and a brick, have each in them their efficient working-force which both fixes and moves the appearances, and this inner efficient is the real entity. Now, this reality connecting the appearances is the Platonic Idea, not at all as mentally *made* but a real rationally *known*, and every observed object of whatever sort has its idea, and that idea is the only real object. This idea holds the many phenomena together *indivisibly* in the object and so makes of the multiplicity an *individuality*, and therein also a concrete universality. All sense-phenomena become known as individual objects, only by the reason-insight detecting their respective real ideas, and thus it is that the entire phenomenal world has its entity as a reality in the ideas; and in this is found the Platonic logical law for thinking sense-appearances into valid judgments.

And now, beyond this logical connecting of the phenomena comes a dialectical mental questioning; how may these ideas be known in their connections? The like reason-insight, which knew the phenomena conspiring in one, knows also all ideas to be conspiring in unity, each holding others and all holding each determinately, so that one being taken all others may be known, and thereby is the individual completely known only in the universal. And further still, the reason sees in the universe of the phenomenal and real that it has also its comprehending fountain of all efficiency and rationality, and this is the Good, as called by Plato, standing independent in personal self-sufficiency, and both sustaining and ruling the dependent Universe. The phenomenal in the real occasions the Universe to be known in the distinctions of space, and time, and individuality; but the Good, as reality beyond all sense appearing, necessitates that to him all distinctions of space, and time, and substantial divisibility, must be utterly impertinent.

So, moreover, the one common space and common time give occasion for all possible pure figures and numbers to be constructed within them; and since they cannot be regulated by the real ideas, in their purity, and only ruled in reason by definitions and axioms ultimate and universal, they give rise to a middle science between the phenomenal and real, viz: mathematics, to which the

absolute space and time are concretes, and every figure constructed within them is a concrete, and every demonstration a law for and not a deduction from the Empirical, and so they afford for the reason a field of known truth ultimate and eternal.

We have here then a *priori*, independent of our form of representation, both in its reality and its ruling. In the physics, the idea rules the phenomenal experience and is no abstraction nor deduction from the experience. The phenomena can be intelligible only by the idea, the ideas only by their union in the cosmos, and the Universe only by its comprehension in the Good. And in the mathematics, the demonstration can be convincing only as ruled by the definitions and axioms, and these must be alike for all rational beings. In none of these can the posterior have any meaning but as interpreted in the light of the prior. Just as soon as the insight flashes through the constructed diagram, the demonstration is irrefragable; and just so soon as the phenomenal world is apprehended in its logical ideas, the dialectic shoots up, as the minaret from the mosque, and at a glance the Universe and its God are known as the dependent on the Absolute.

II. THE ARISTOTELIAN DIALECTIC. The logic in this will ever be an abstraction and deduction from a precedent experiment, and so a logic of the understanding only, and attaining its universals only from what appears in the particulars; while some minor modifications of the logical will so far modify the dialectical process. Any *a priori* knowing will be only of that which we ourselves put into the objects.

1. *The Variety of Logic that Regulates the Knowing by the Object.* This is Aristotle's own method, and it of course rules his dialectic. The prime principle is that of contradiction, viz: that of two universal opposites one only can be true; and he trusts so little in reason and will so invariably have experiment, that he seeks to prove its truth by showing that any opposer to it can be made to contradict himself, as if contradiction by an example could be a more repulsive absurdity than when only in the light of reason alone. The logic begins with the known in experience and seeks by this to reach the unknown. Particulars are sorted in species and graded genera till the conception of abstract being is reached, in which is universal essence exclusive of all difference, and here logic must terminate, since all predication ceases. Below this, all syllogistic forms may be arranged and deductions concluded, but all questioning beyond is dialectic and belongs to

First Philosophy, or Metaphysics. All essence is here just as found in experience, and the dialectical querying is, what more can analysis and abstraction get from it? It is then found *potential* for all changes, which will give *matter* and *form*, the one merely capable for any changes and thus *passive*, the other *active* in passing into form and taking the essence along with it. In the actual is *material*, *formal*, *moving*, and *final causes* in combination, in which the movement attains the end and is satisfied. Here, movement and end are identical in that the moving has its object, just as the eye acts and objectifies in the acting, or as mind thinks and is satisfied in the thinking, even so the universal energy ever grasps the Universe and in that satisfies its aim. This is Aristotle's grand ENTELECHY, the eternal *thinking of thought*.

We pass now all critical remark, that nothing is here satisfactory in the presumption that nature has any substantial and causal connections, and is truly a Universe; that we can apprehend a self as free personality, either as creature or creator; and that there is no opening for morality or religion; we only note that there is and can be here no *a priori* knowledge. All the known given is in the phenomenal, and the only way to the unknown is through the sense-known. We may abstract and deduce, we have no insight to verify presuppositions and prerequisites. Neither the logic nor dialectic can reach anything *prior* to the Empirical. The only semblance of *a priori* knowledge is in making a limited induction stand for universal observation. We cannot perceive all; we have observed so much and so well, that we may take this as receipt for the deficit. We presume that the future is mirrored in the past, and that what has been is a warrant for what will yet be. Indeed this logic does not claim, but disdainfully discards all *a priori* knowing.

2. *The Logic which Regulates the Knowing by the Subject.*—Spinoza might be here adduced who takes the understanding to be distinct from the universal substance, and constitutionally gives to the substance the attributes of thought and extension, mind and matter, in complete harmony; or Leibnitz might be cited, whose view of mind and matter is that in distinct substance they are monads representing together each by itself according to a pre-established harmony, the former in consciousness and the latter in unconsciousness; both Spinoza and Leib-

nitz, acquiring such instruments for representing, could then *a priori* speak of the knowing. But under this variety, Kant is the fullest and fairest example. We observe man representing by sense, and judging by understanding, and both in such a manner that we are induced to give to the sense constitutionally the forms of space and time as intuitions, and to the understanding those of the categorical conceptions. We find him competent to know only by ordering the intuitions in and by the conceptions. That Empirical intuitions may be given to the constitutional intuitions of space and time, a *noumenon* as "thing-in-itself" is assumed, but cannot be known since it cannot of itself be envisaged. Beyond these intuitions and conceptions, there are constitutionally the formal ideas of the Infinite and Absolute in the Reason, but as these forms cannot be filled through sense, their objects cannot be reached by human intelligence.

Taking thus, from experimental trial, what the human mental constitution is, we may say *a priori* what it is competent to do. Such a mind may know what can be envisaged in space and time and ordered in the categorical conceptions, but nothing beyond. The Empirical intuitions in space and time may be ordered in all the categories of Quality, Quantity, Relation, and Mode; but not in the ideas of the infinite and absolute; they may be perceived and conceived, but never so as to have known infinity and absolute being. Space and time themselves can go into the category of Quantity so far as they may be limited, but not as infinite and absolute, and can never so be known by man. Substance can hold the accidents, and cause connect the events just as supposed or assumed in the *noumenon*, but never as real entities in reason. We may know the necessary and the contingent as fixed or potential, but nothing as free and personal, for in this dialectic we can prove as much *against* as we can *for* freedom. Presuppositions in philosophy, and postulates in morality, can stand under no forms and come within no judgments of the sense and understanding, and if they are to have validity they must be known by some other faculty. Our *a priori* knowing can reach only to our constitutional making, and if supposed to reach further, this logic should admit the contradiction or find some place for a new faculty.

3. *The Logic Regulating the Phenomenal in Thought.* Fichte and Schelling may here be included in Hegel, last and greatest of transcendental thinkers, and for present purpose we need refer-

ence to Hegel's philosophy only. It is wholly by abstraction from the phenomenal and passing from particulars to a universal, and thus is thoroughly Aristotelian; admitting nothing of Plato's reason and using nothing of his ideas in real entity. Kant's *noumenon* is also discarded, and while thus phenomenal, it is also of the inner or mental phenomena alone. Hegel first takes his "voyage of discovery" and records the movement and attainment gained in his experiment, in his *Phenomenology*, and which turns out to be an abstraction thinner and broader than had before been used. The vision taken is mental inspection rather than rational speculation, and what is found is as nakedly "a mode of motion" as is Tyndall's notion of heat. He knows only phenomenal acts, and these exclusively thinking acts, and all their appearances are wrought in us by our own movement as surely as in our dreaming.

The appearance first taken is immediate, and thus indeterminate, and the act has nothing further of it than a "this," wholly indefinite. But *this* means nothing without a *that*, and so the act discedes into two counterparts and *this* and *that* limit each other, and yet we cannot take one without the other, and in such unity we get a middle-third, which has now become for us a *this determined*. And just such movement is perpetuated to and through common consciousness, self-consciousness, and into reason, wherein the objective of common consciousness and the subjective of self-consciousness become known in the one reason-act, and in this we have the truth of all our discoveries in a self-cause, potential for all self-manifestation. This may be known as Idea, not at all Plato's reality but Aristotle's potentiality and actuality. Applied to abstract being in the above method of stating, disparting, and reuniting, through all occurring categories, it is science of Logic; then applied to abstract externality it is science of Nature; and then combined with internality it is made science of Mind, wherein we have found universal Spirit—the God-thinking to be also God-manifesting throughout all created phases.

Here then is the most marvelous system of abstract thought that the world has had from a human understanding, all produced from one activity, working after one method, and conforming with surprising exactness to our outer knowledge and our inner thinking; and yet the whole is the phenomenal in merely thinking-act. The unsound part is in the closing assumption that such a movement can attain to a self-knowing and freely

willing personality in reason. So constituted, it could only act on in its method endlessly, with no capability to presuppose any other mode of movement than that of its past experience. It is not competent to forecast, but only to know as the thinking-act reveals itself.

The knowing is in and by the moving, and the method of the movement has been found in experiment, by an actual discovery of what passes in consciousness from immediate appearance to self-recognition, and in the logic by actually carrying the abstract conception of being through all categorical judgments. We are warned against all prompting to anticipate what is to come, and bid just to look on the movement and see what does come. It can only say what *must* be from having discovered its constitution in what it *has done*, and so knowing what must be its own making. If it were guided by Plato's reason, it would know the reason's space and time as concrete in themselves, illimitable, immutable, and not mere abstract externality. It would see that these must be, in order that place and period might be in them; and that place and period must be held persistent or pass successive by a common object for all, in order that all may in common know the same place and period. This would be true *a priori* knowing, as it would be knowing in reason what must be for all reason, and not merely for a specially constituted understanding. The reason space and time is prior to place and period, and the persistent real ideas must be prior in the places and periods for all, and give their connected phenomena to all prior to the perceiving, and known as so being, or we cannot *a priori* know how all must know in common. Such knowledge the thinking-process cannot gain except as in connection with quite another faculty for knowing.

III. THE CONCLUSION. We now know Plato's dialectic as recognizing and using a process peculiar to itself. It takes fleeting phenomena with no intelligent consistency in themselves, which yet in their grouping and flowing have enough of method and order to indicate infallibly some existent efficiency working in the standing and flowing appearances; and thus he both saves and harmonizes the two sides of what had then been a long dispute, viz: whether the standing or the flowing had real being. This is effected by attaining being for both, but each after its own fashion. One is perceived in sense, standing in and passing off the field of consciousness; the other evinces its reality, to an in-

sight sharper than sense, as perpetually existing and working in those sense-appearances. This penetrating organ is the Reason, which, as apprehended by Plato, is competent with quick glance to detect, and with steady gaze to comprehend, the real entity determining the appearing; and which he terms *idea*, since it is an object the reason attains beyond all sense-perceiving. And yet, in Plato's age the observation of phenomena had been too partial to admit of a full expression of its meaning to the reason. Nature had many mysteries, and seemed abortive in frequent occurrences, or monstrous and wayward in her occasional productions. The way the phenomena were connected with the idea, and the method also in which the ideas were themselves bound together were but obscurely seen, although the fact of these connections was to him unmistakable. More especially were the ineffable perfections of the Good, as Author and Ruler of all, held to be forever inscrutable secrets without some divinely communicated revelation. He knew the fine thread his reason saw was a real guide through the labyrinth, though there were many tangled loops he could not unravel. He knew that matter and mind made up a cosmos, and that the Good held and moved the Universe in wisdom; and he has spoken out his message so well that the ages since have kept and studied the record as the wisest word among its philosophical teachers.

Aristotle was still greater than Plato, but only in his own distinct field of thought and utterance. Cautious and careful, patient and persevering, he will feel out the thread he does not see by analysis, abstraction and deduction, and will never take one step in the dark except as literally he can keep his clew in his hand. The working philosophy of the world has, since his day, been, nearly entire, kept within the compass of his dialectic, varying the logic as each found he might best leap the abysses which he could not fathom. It has done much for Platonism, while that has been held in abeyance till the materials shall be found and gathered for its universal prevalence. Reason reads by its own light, and yet only as the printed book is laid before it. It makes for man no new truths nor reveals to him hidden wisdom garnered up in stores of its own, and only takes from legible characters the meaning previously put within them and expressed by them. This is the full import of *a priori* human knowing, viz: seeing in nature's phenomena the veritable entities which already were, prior to the appearing, and necessary condition for

the appearing, and the more clearly seen by so much as the expression has been the more sharply cut. And it is just here that so much has been done for future Platonic questioning. The physics and metaphysics studied and taught under Aristotelian masters have made both matter and mind a plainer book now, for reason, than Plato ever had in hand. What of fact physical science is gaining in the modern doctrine of the conversion and conservation of forces, and what especially German logic and dialectic have discovered in profound abstract thought, have opened wide occasion for expounding the connections of phenomena and idea, and idea with idea, in ample plainness and fullness, that until his death remained dark and unsatisfactory to Plato. But much as Platonism owes to Aristotelian dialectic, the latter begins and ends within the natural, while the former only can *a priori* know the supernatural; and sure as the ages the time is coming, when every logical grist shall be carried to Plato's old mill, and there together all be ground in one logic and one dialectic, which will make of all the one Philosophy.

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## HERBART'S IDEAS ON EDUCATION.

Translated from the German of Dr. KARL SCHMIDT\* (*Geschichte der Pädagogik*), by HUGO HAANEL.

John Frederick Herbart was born the 4th of May, 1776, in the

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\*Dr. Karl Schmidt's sketch of Herbart's Pedagogics is herewith presented with notes designed to prepare the way for a review of Herbart's system, which may appear in a subsequent number of this journal. These notes have been added with a view to compare Herbart's views with those of other systems better known, and thereby interpret them. Though the additions to the text are not only quite free, but, at times, imply criticism, the general connection of the remarks will bear evidence that they have been conceived in the spirit of Herbart's arduous undertaking to make the formation of moral character the aim and end of public education. The text and the comments being separated by brackets, the latter may be disregarded without much inconvenience.—[TRANSLATOR.]